Introduction and summary

As Croatia is less than a year away from EU accession, it is interesting to analyse what has been negotiated in the area of state aid, i.e. what adjustments the country will have to make with in this respect. An analysis of state aid development in the EU-12 Member States, which joined the EU in 2004 and
2007 (Jović, 2012) • Following its uneven movements over the 2002-10 period, total state aid 1 in Croatia is still 2.4 times higher than that in .
• Since 2002, aid The growth path of Croatia's state aid towards such high shares in GDP was far from linear. The share of total aid in GDP during the 2002-10 period (Chart 2) clearly shows uneven dynamics, i.e. alternation between periods of its growth and periods of its decline. It is interesting to note that growth in the share of aid in GDP was due to political movements in the country, so that it reached its peak in 2003 and 2007 accession years, suggests that in Croatia as well, state aid will not stop growing until accession.
Movements in the share of total state aid in GDP are heavily infl uenced by sectoral aid movements. The almost identical curves of total aid and sectoral aid during the entire sample period clearly show how strongly the total aid movements depend on sectoral aid. This is understandable, given that sectoral aid accounted for the bulk of total aid provided during the entire 2002-10 period (Table 1) .
Another specifi city worth noting is the trend in aid to agriculture and fi sheries. Instead of following the sectoral aid movements, aid to agriculture has continuously grown, almost independently from other economic con- to this steady upward trend, without going into any details about supporting agriculture.
Furthermore, it is worrying that the share of horizontal aid intended for all enterprises and not only for selected sectors or enterprises, in GDP has declines continuously. This aid is allocated for research and development, small and medium-sized enterprises, environmental protection professional training, employment, etc., and its objective is to correct market failures and thus stimulate economic growth, encourage competition and contribute to the overall economic prosperity of the country. The share of this aid stood at 0.5% of GDP in 2004, but halved to only 0.2% of GDP in 2010.
What were the objectives for which the bulk of public funds were spent during the nine-year period? Sectoral aid was the dominating government's industrial policy instrument throughout the sample period, accounting for over 76% of total aid, while horizontal aid participated with as litt le as 15% in the total.
As expected, shipbuilding was the record holder in sectoral aid, having received HRK 13 billion, followed by transport (HRK 10 billion, mostly granted to Croatian Railways) and radio and television broadcasting (HRK 5 billion).
As concerns horizontal aid, the bulk of funds were allocated for employment incentives (HRK 2.2 billion), followed by R&D and small and medium-sized enterprises (HRK 1 billion each). Environmental protection and energy saving were no major concerns for government's aid policy: with only HRK 187 million of aid received, they almost brought up the rear on the list of horizontal aid recipients.
If 2010, the last year of the sample period, is singled out in the analysis, no signifi cant changes can be observed. Specifi cally, horizontal aid did not increase and its share in total aid even dropped by 3.2 percentage points (from 15% to 11.8%) relative to the entire reference period, suggesting that the state aid policy still did not undergo any fundamental structural reforms. This was confi rmed by movements in sectoral aid, the share of which in total aid even increased by one percentage point in 2010 relative to the entire period, from 76.1% to 77.1%.
On the other hand, a comparison of the state aid structures in 2010 between Croatia and EU-27 shows that Croatia has to make a tremendous eff ort to carry out the necessary structural reforms of its economy. To be specifi c, while in 2010, sectoral aid accounted for 15% of total aid in EU-27, its share in Croatia exceeded 68% 4 of total aid (less 4 The data in column 5 of Table 1 have been prepared for a comparitransport), i. e. it was 4.5 times larger. Horizontal aid (including regional aid) in EU-27 accounted for as much as 85% of total aid, almost three times more than in Croatia (32% of total aid less transport).
State aid in the Treaty Concerning the Accession of Croatia to the European Union
As suggested by the above analysis, Croatia made no signifi cant progress in the area of state aid during the nineyear period under review, which clearly shows that no major structural economic reforms were carried out. In 2010, the share of state aid in GDP was one of the largest in Europe, while the structure of aid remained almost unchanged throughout the period, with sectoral aid having a dominant share, especially in the shipbuilding and transport sectors.
The EU accession is expected to bring about substantial changes: the size of aid should fi nally be reduced and its structure should change in favour of sectoral rather than horizontal aid. The state aid control should be taken over by the European Commission.
The Accession Treaty determines that Croatia has assumed the EU acquis communautaire and specifi es the terms of its membership. The Accession Treaty provisions governing market competition also include conditions for state aid allocation, relating to the obligations assumed by Croatia with respect to the restructuring of the shipbuilding and steel sectors and the defi nition of existing aid. Below is a brief presentation of the obligations assumed with respect to these areas 5 .
Shipbuilding
Under , that constitute an integral part of the EU acquis and apply to all undertakings in the EU territory. The Rules generally envisage compensation measures for reducing capacity and output, as well as own contributions of undertakings undergoing restructuring, and they have been elaborated for Croatia in its Accession Treaty.
The purpose of compensation measures is to minimise the negative eff ects of aid on trading conditions. If an enterprise receives aid, its presence in the market must be limited, because otherwise that enterprise would be in a much more favourable market position compared to an enterprise that has not received aid. In such a case, market competition would be distorted, and such aid would be 6 An abstract of Annex VIII to the Accession Treaty. 7 Croatia has accepted these Rules and published them in the NN 20/07. considered "contrary to the common interest", i.e. incompatible with the internal market. The capacity and output reductions agreed by Croatia for its shipbuilding companies represent compensation measures aimed at providing access to the common European market. Therefore, the huge amounts of state aid granted in Croatia in the previous period would not put the national shipyards in a more favourable position compared to other European shipbuilders.
Contributions to the restructuring plan provided by companies from their own resources are also laid down in the acquis and are envisaged by the Rules on Rescue and Restructuring Aid to range from 25% (for small enterprises) to 40% (medium enterprises) and 50% (large enterprises). The purpose of providing own contribution to the restructuring process by a company is to strictly limit the amount and intensity of state aid, as well as to reduce the use of public funds to a necessary minimum and strengthen the responsibility of companies for restructuring. The Accession Treaty envisages the contribution of own funds to represent 40% of the total restructuring costs of Croatian shipyards, which classifi es them as medium-sized enterprises. Together with the aid granted in 2011 and 2012, which remains to be calculated with compound interest and publicly disclosed by the CCA, the amounts to be recovered by the shipbuilding companies are really huge. This indicates the seriousness of the challenge confronting the Croatian Government and shows how vital it is -aft er the bankruptcy of Brodogradilište Kraljevica and the signing of the Brodosplit privatisation contract with DIV Group, to accelerate and complete the privatisation of 3. Maj and Brodotrogir shipyards 9 .
It is interesting to recall what Malta and Poland, two new Member States with major shipbuilding industries, agreed in their respective EU Accession Treaties. Malta had two shipyards and shipbuilding constituted the biggest individual industry in the country, characterised by overcapacity, insuffi cient fi nancing facilities, high labour costs and low productivity levels. In order to restructure its state-owned, loss-making shipyards, Malta agreed upon a transition regime monitored by the Commission, allowing it to grant restructuring aid up to a maximum of EUR 948 million over a period from 2002 to end-2008. Unlike Malta, Poland had a large shipbuilding sector, but it did not negotiate any transitional periods for the application of state aid rules. Instead, Gdynia and Szczecin shipyards were required to fi nalise their fi nancial and material restructuring plans by 2006 and 2004 (European Commission, 2004 .
It should be noted that, once the restructuring and privatisation of shipbuilding companies is complete, Croatia will be allowed to continue granting aid to this sector, in accordance with the European Framework on State Aid to Shipbuilding (see Box). Pursuant to these rules, aid to shipbuilding can be granted in the form of regional aid, aid for innovation and export credits. Generally, however, shipbuilding companies will be supported as any other enterprise, i.e. in accordance with the rules governing other horizontal aid.
New EU rules on state aid to shipbuilding
The European Commission has adopted a new Framework on State Aid to Shipbuilding (OJ 2011/C 364/06)) that became applicable on 1 January 2012 and will expire on 31 December 2013. Croatia has not yet incorporated the Framework into its legislation. However, it will be obliged to apply it, as part of the EU acquis. The Framework continues to allows aid for innovation in shipbuilding and export crediting, as well as regional aid, but it does not allow closure, employment and development aid, as regulated under the "old" Framework on State Aid to Shipbuilding, because the Commission considers this aid not to be specifi c to the shipbuilding sector only, and, as such, to be subject to other state aid rules. The Commission envisages that, aft er 2013, the innovation aid and regional aid to shipbuilding will also be regulated by other rules on horizontal aid.
Steel
The . Upon Croatia's accession, if CMC Sisak d.o.o. fails to reimburse the entire amount of debt, the Commission will order Croatia to recover any rescue and restructuring aid granted to this company since 1 March 2006, with compound interest. Aid received by the steel mill Željezara Split will also have to be reimbursed. In May 2011, CCA ordered that Željezara Split should reimburse aid in the amount of HRK 289 million with accrued interest, because, due to bankruptcy, the company was incapable of meeting the conditions relating to investment, realisation of profi t, etc., which gave rise to irregularities in the application of state aid regulations Therefore, these countries' accession treaties provided for transitional arrangements. In slightly more than two years aft er the accession (by 31 December 2006) they had to complete the restructuring of their steel sectors. Subject to closely monitored conditions, the Commission allowed these countries the granting of state aid in the period of 1997-2003 in the maximum amounts of EUR 413 million (Czech Republic) and EUR 769 million (Poland) (European Commission, 2004) .
Despite the uncertain fate of the Croatian iron and steel industry, future investors can still count on state aid pursuant to the Rules on State Aid to the Steel Sector (NN 134/08), based on the State aid Act, i.e. the acquis commmunautaire. It is important to distinguish between the existing and new aid. Aid that is regarded as "existing aid" under the Accession Treaty shall be subject to examination by the Commission even aft er the EU accession. Should any such aid measures be found incompatible with the acquis, the Commission may order that they be amended or abolished, but it cannot require reimbursement of granted aid. In contrast to this, all other aid considered as "new aid" can also be examined by the Commission, but the Commission can order reimbursement of the granted aid. A list att ached to Annex IV to the Accession Treaty sets out seven state aid measures that shall continue to be applied aft er Croatia's accession to the EU and shall be considered as "existing aid". Croatia has applied for another four measures, compatible with the acquis to be included in this list, and to be considered as "existing aid" upon accession (European Commission, 2012a) . More specifi cally, it is in the interest of every future Member State to have as many as possible state aid measures considered as "existing aid", because, should such aid be found incompatible with the acquis, it can be amended or abolished, but the recovery of aid amounts already granted cannot be required. For example, during the accession process of EU-10 Member States, the largest number of existing state aid measures were approved to Czech Republic (120) and the smallest to Estonia (only 3). These 13 An abstract of Annex IV to the Accession Treaty. measures were incorporated in the countries' respective Accession Treaties (European Commission, 2004) .
Existing aid
The EU has imposed strong external conditionality on the new Member States with respect to state aid, as this area is considered crucial for avoiding competition distortions and preserving the common market (Mulas-Granados, Koranchelian and Segura-Ubiergo, 2008) . The external conditionality exerts decisive pressure on accession candidates to change their state aid measures. This is suggested by movements in and the structure of state aid in EU-12, where the share of aid in GDP decreased while allocations for horizontal objectives increased in almost all the Member States 14 . In Croatia, too, external conditionality, i.e. pressures from the EU, prompted long-delayed changes in state aid policy. The restructuring and privatisation of the steel, shipbuilding and railway sectors accelerated with the approaching of the date of accession, by which these processes should be completed.
State aid in Croatia after EU accession
Croatia's pre-accession experience in developing a state aid system was similar to the experiences of other candidate countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. During the pre-accession period, these countries were supposed to incorporate state aid control systems into their legislation, similar to those in the EU, in order to ensure the approval, control, but also the reimbursement of unlawful aid. Another requirement was to establish an authority responsible for the implementation of that system. Croatia has complied with these requirements by adopting the relevant legislation; it established a Croatian Competition Agency and transposed the rules on state aid, incorporated in the EU acquis, into its national legislation. These rules have been applied for a long number of years, i.e. since the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 2001. Ever since that date, the CCA has gradually, persistently and consistently applied these rules to both undertakings receiving aid and public authorities that grant it.
Upon accession, the assessment of the lawfulness of state aid, its surveillance and recovery will be transferred to the exclusive jurisdiction of the European Commission, the only authority competent for making decisions on state aid for all Member States. This will also change the role of the CCA, which will, as in all other Member States, become a subsidiary body of the European Commission for the registration and notifi cation of state aid, data collection, keeping the register of state aid, providing information, rendering assistance to aid providers, etc. However, the transfer of competence for state aid matt ers to the European Commission does not mean that Croatia will not be allowed to grant aid. It will continue to grant it, as do all the other EU Member States. Providing fi nancial support to enterprises is not prohibited in the EU, and is subject to the same rules as those already implemented by the CCA. The only diff erence is that, aft er 1 July 2013, these rules will be enforced by the European Commission. Croatia will have to make certain administrative, technical and personnel adjustments to this eff ect in order to enable the CCA to provide adequate assistance to the Commission.
The Commission is preparing substantial changes in the state aid scheme to become eff ective by end-2013, i.e. shortly upon Croatia's accession. These changes are aimed at modernising state aid and are part of a broader EU strategy to stimulate economic growth, target aid at market failures and promote rational use of public resources. The Commission will examine, streamline and amend most aid allocation rules, particularly those relating to rescue and restructuring, environmental protection and regional aid, and will facilitate the decisionmaking processes. The CCA must closely monitor these changes and make the necessary administrative arrangements for participating in their implementation (European Commission, 2012b).
Aft er the EU accession, the size and structure of state aid will increasingly resemble those of the current Member States. The share of aid in GDP is expected to trend downwards, state aid will be less and bett er targeted, and sectoral aid will be reduced. This means that state aid will be focused on the so-called horizontal objectives, such as research and development, environmental protection, employment, regional development, etc. A reduction is expected primarily in sectoral aid to companies in difficulties, which distorts competition and favours one, usually less successful fi rm, over others, where the aid granted to such a fi rm only postpones its inevitable exit from the market.
As the date of Croatia's EU accession approaches, external conditionality intensifi es, accelerating changes in the area of state aid: the restructuring and privatisation of the shipbuilding sector, the largest recipient of aid, must be completed by the accession date (otherwise, shipyards will have to reimburse the aid received since 1 March 2006); due to bankruptcy proceedings in the Split and Sisak steel mills, aid to the steel sector was completely suspended aft er 2008, and the two steel producers were ordered to reimburse the unlawfully granted aid; arrangements are being made for the restructuring of Croatian Railways, the largest state aid recipient in the transport sector, and it is planned to be carried out during the current year, because the accession will lead to the liberalisation of the railway market and entry of other operators into the national market 15 . The Ministry of Finance has not planned any increases in subsidies in the national budget 16 -in 2014, they will be held at the same level as in 2013 (Ministry of Finance of the RC, 2012). Nevertheless, there are no discernible moves towards horizontal aid, as no programmes were submitt ed for approval to the CCA during 2011 that would suggest any signifi cant increase in aid for horizontal objectives (CCA, 2011).
Croatia's EU accession will bring about changes in the national state aid policy. Consequently, the "old" model based on "providing selective aid to sectors in diffi culties, to the detriment of others which produce goods and services of high value added or develop new forms of entrepreneurship" (CCA, 2011) will become unsustainable. This should be accepted, as soon as possible, by all economic agents: public institutions, trade unions, managers and employees, but also the general public. The time has come when scarce public resources must fi nally start to be used rationally.
